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often	 refers	 to	 them,	 “constituting	 consciousnesses”	—	that	 exist	 out-
side	 of	 physical	 space	 and	 time	 (as	 Kant	 and	 post-Kantian	 Idealists	
suggest).	
Merleau-Ponty’s	 account	 of	 embodied	 subjects	 as	 essentially	 em-
bedded,	meanwhile,	attempts	to	dissolve	the	sharp	distinction	between	
conscious	 subjects	 and	 physical	 objects.	 From	 an	 ontological	 point	
of	 view,	 perceiving	 subjects	 are	 not	 immaterial,	 and	 objects	 are	 not	





in	 merely	 “positional”	 spatial	 terms:	 that	 is,	 as	 one	 object	 amongst	
others	located	in	objective	space.	Rather	our	awareness	of	ourselves	










that	 veridical	 perceptual	 experiences	 are	 essentially	 relational,	 they	
differ	in	kind	to	non-veridical	experiences	such	as	hallucinations.	Fifth,	




The	 following	 sections	 consider	 these	 claims	 in	 turn.	 In	 §§1–4,	 I	
argue	that	Merleau-Ponty	can	be	understood	as	endorsing	interesting	
versions	of	 the	first	 four	claims	associated	with	contemporary	naïve	
realism,	and	 to	 this	extent	he	accepts	 something	 like	a	naïve	 realist	
theory	 of	 perception.	 In	 §5,	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 comparison	 with	 naïve	
realism	breaks	down	insofar	as	Merleau-Ponty’s	theory	of	perception,	










constituted,	 at	 least	 in	 part,	 by	 the	 things	—	objects,	 properties,	 rela-
tions	—	in	a	 subject’s	environment	 that	 they	are	experiences	of.	The	
claim	that	perceptual	experiences	are	essentially	relational	in	this	way	
involves	a	kind	of	“situational	spatiality”.	We	are	aware	of	ourselves	as	









A	 number	 of	 recent	 discussions	 of	 Merleau-Ponty	 in	 the	 Anglo-
phone	 tradition	 have	 drawn	 comparisons	 to	 contemporary	 debates	
about	 enactive	 theories	 of	 perception	 (e.g.	 Noë	 2006),	 whether	 the	
content	 of	 perceptual	 experience	 is	 non-conceptual	 (e.g.	 Kelly	 2001,	
Carman	2008:	220–3),	and	the	kind	of	disjunctivist	theory	of	percep-
tion	defended	by	McDowell	(e.g.	Jensen	2013,	Berendzen	2013).	This	
paper	 explores	 a	 different	 comparison:	 that	 between	 Merleau-Pon-
ty’s	 theory	 of	 perception	 and	 contemporary	 naïve	 realist	 theories	 of	
perception.1 
Whereas	 Merleau-Ponty’s	 philosophical	 project	 is,	 in	 part,	 a	 reac-
tion	 to	Kantian	and	post-Kantian	 Idealism	as	 it	manifested	 itself	pri-
marily	 in	 France	 and	 Germany,	 contemporary	 naïve	 realist	 theories	
of	perception	have	their	roots	in	the	response	of	Oxford	Realists	like	
Cook	 Wilson,	 Pritchard,	 and	 Austin	 to	 predominantly	 British	 mani-
festations	 of	 post-Kantian	 Idealism	 in	 the	 later	 nineteenth	 century	
(cf.	 Kalderon	 and	 Travis	 2013). Contemporary	 naïve	 realist	 theories	
of	 perception	 are	 philosophical	 theories	 of	 perception,	 and	 as	 such	
embody	 substantive	 philosophical	 claims.	 Naïve	 realist	 theories	 of	
perception	are	not	a	natural	kind,	and	come	in	a	variety	of	different	
forms;	however,	they	commonly	embody	a	commitment	to	some	or	all	
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call	“success	words”.	As	Merleau-Ponty	puts	 it,	 “If	 I	see	an	ashtray	 in 



















called	 “having	 a	 sensory	 perception”	 is	 strictly	 just	 this	
(1642:	19).	
Merleau-Ponty,	 by	 contrast,	 insists	 that	 “[p]erception	 and	 the	 per-
ceived	necessarily	have	the	same	existential	modality”	(PP	393);	this	
is	 to	say	 that	 if	 I	am	perceiving,	 then	necessarily	what	 I	am	perceiv-
ing	exists.	For	Merleau-Ponty,	there	is	no	psychological	event	of	“hav-












Naïve	 realist	 theories	 of	 perception	 contrast	 in	 this	 respect	 with	
theories	of	perception	according	to	which	perceptual	experiences	are	















(at	 least	on	a	particular	occasion)	of	how	things	are	 in	 the	subject’s	
environment:	 it	 is	possible	 for	 the	subject	 to	have	exactly	 the	same	
kind	of	experience	whether	or	not	the	environment	is	as	it	is	perceived	
to	be.
Merleau-Ponty	accepts	 that	perceptual	experience	 is	relational	 in	
the	strong	sense	accepted	by	naïve	realists.	According	to	Merleau-Pon-
ty,	‘see’	—	and	‘perceive’	more	generally	—	are	what	Ryle	(1949)	would	
2.	 Some	 sense-datum	 theorists	 sought	 to	 argue	 that	 sense-data	 “belong	 to”	
things	 in	 the	 environment;	 however,	 even	 so	 understood,	 sense-data	 are	
necessarily	 distinct	 from	 material	 objects,	 to	 allow	 that	 veridical	 and	 non-
veridical	experiences	form	a	common	kind.
	 keith	allen Merleau-Ponty and Naïve Realism
philosophers’	imprint	 –		4		–	 vol.	19,	no.	2	(january	2019)




jects	 take	 on	 the	 attributes	 of	 the	 sensible;	 they	 do	 not	 themselves	






































not	 opposite	 each	 other	 like	 two	 external	 terms,	 and	

























itself	 determined	 by	 accuracy	 or	 correctness	 conditions:	 conditions	
that	 specify	 how	 things	 must	 be	 in	 the	 subject’s	 environment	 if	 the	
experience	is	veridical.
The	 claim	 that	 perceptual	 experiences	 are	 essentially	 relational	
does	not	suffice	 to	distinguish	naïve	realism	from	all	 forms	of	 inten-
tionalism.	 Some	 intentionalists	 insist	 that	 there	 is	 a	 sense	 in	 which	
perceptual	experience	is	essentially	relational,	because	perceptual	ex-
perience	essentially	involves	representational	content	that	needs	to	be	







relational	 nature	 of	 perception.	 Intentionalists	 of	 this	 kind	 will	 typi-









differ	 in	 this	 respect	 from	 naïve	 realists.	 According	 to	 naïve	 realists,	
the	obtaining	of	the	perceptual	relation	is	distinct	from,	and	standard-
ly	more	basic	than,	the	intentional	attitudes	that	we	can	adopt	towards	
As	 the	 analogy	 with	 communion	 suggests,	 Merleau-Ponty	 thinks	

















a	 certain	 way.	 Rather,	 the	 attitudes	—	typically	 judgments	—	that	 per-
ceivers	 adopt	 towards	 what	 is	 presented	 in	 perception	 are	 constitu-










intentionalist	 theories	 of	 perception	 in	 this	 respect.	 According	 to	







widely	 accepted	 (PP	 lxxxiii).	 It	 was	 accepted,	 for	 instance,	 by	 Kant,	







the	 relational	nature	 of	acquaintance,	 there	 can	be	no	conscious	 ac-
quaintance	 without	 an	object	 of	 acquaintance,	and	hence	 the	naïve	
realist	too	can	accept	that	“all	consciousness	is	consciousness	of	some-
thing”.	We	 therefore	cannot	conclude	simply	 from	 the	 fact	 that	Mer-
leau-Ponty	 thinks	 that	 perceptual	 experiences	 are	 intentional	 in	 the	
sense	of	exhibiting	“aboutness”	—	that	“all	consciousness	is	conscious-
ness	of	 something”	—	that	 they	are	 intentional	 in	 the	sense	of	being	
fundamentally	representational	states	or	events	that	are	individuated	
by	their	representational	content,	non-conceptual	or	otherwise.4
An	 alternative	 way	 of	 interpreting	 Merleau-Ponty	 is	 as	 claim-
ing	 that	 perceptual	 experience	 consists	 essentially but not exclusively 
in	 the	obtaining	of	a	relation	of	acquaintance	between	subjects	and	
objects.	Merleau-Ponty	agrees	with	the	relationalist	that	openness	to	









that	 which	 we	 are	 perceptually	 related	 to.	 As	 Soteriou,	 for	 instance,	
remarks:	
the	claim	that	the	relevant	psychological	relation	is	non-




tive	of	whether	 the	mental	state	 in	question	 is	a	 factive	
one,	and	irrespective	of	whether	the	content	of	the	state	
is	object-involving	(2013:	107;	see	also	Brewer	2011:	131).
One	 way	 of	 interpreting	 Merleau-Ponty	—	the	 “overcomer	 of	 dis-
tinctions”	—	is	 as	 suggesting	 a	 middle	 way	 between	 the	 extremes	 of	
austere	relationalism	and	intentionalism.	Merleau-Ponty	is	hostile	to	
views	according	to	which	perception	involves	“representation”.	As	he	
says	 while	 considering	 the	 perception	 of	 three-dimensional	 objects	
from	a	particular	point	of	view,	for	example:
Should	we	say,	as	psychologists	often	have	done,	 that	 I	





Of	 itself,	 this	 doesn’t	 necessarily	 mean	 that	 he	 rejects	 an	 inten-
tionalist	theory	of	perception.	Merleau-Ponty	typically	means	by	“rep-
resentation”	 something	 intellectual,	 that	 is	 voluntary	 and	 involves	
the	 application	 of	 concepts:	 what	 Husserl	 calls	 “act	 intentionality”	
(PP	 lxxxii;	 cf.	 e.g.	 PP	 247).	 By	 contrast,	 Merleau-Ponty	 emphasises	
that	 there	 is	 a	 distinct	 kind	 of	 “operative	 intentionality”	 that	 under-
lies	 thought	and	 judgment;	as	he	puts	 it	 in	 “The	Primacy	of	Percep-
tion”,	perceptual	experience	is	“an	original	modality	of	consciousness”	
(PrP	12).	This	might	 in	turn	be	thought	to	suggest	a	commitment	to	
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and	the	 twist	 is	 that	 this	acquaintance	relation	 is	blind,	not	without	







































mordial	 opening	 to	 a	 field	 of	 transcendences”	 but	 “is	 accomplished	





Ponty’s	 anti-Intellectualism,	 the	 additional	 “taking”	 that	 is	 partially	
constitutive	of	perceptual	experience	is	not	an	intellectual	judgment,	
but	rather	a	form	of	“bodily	understanding”:	





















Just	 as	 we	 perceive	 objects,	 and	 not	 merely	 their	 appearances,	 Mer-
leau-Ponty	insists	that	we	perceive	the	constant	properties	of	objects,	












says	in	his	earlier	work	The Structure of Behaviour,	we	are	not	perceptu-
ally	aware	of	any	mental	objects	distinct	from	the	things	themselves:
it	 is	 the	thing	 itself	which	naïve	consciousness	 thinks	 it	
is	reaching,	and	not	some	inner	double,	some	subjective	




I	 have	 argued	 so	 far	 that	 Merleau-Ponty	 agrees	 with	 the	 naïve	 real-
ist	that	perceptual	experiences	are	essentially	relational,	and	that	the	
relationality	of	experience	cannot	be	explained	exclusively	 in	 terms	
of	 our	 experience	 representing	 the	 environment	 as	 being	 a	 certain	








































But	 these	are	not	properties	of	experience	 that	are	anything	 like	
sensations,	 properties	 of	 a	 subjective	 visual	 field,	 or	 qualia.	 Rather,	
they	 are	 essential	 properties	 of	 experience	 that	 determine,	 or	 struc-
ture,	the	way	that	objects	that	are	independent	of	our	experiences	are	
presented.7	 Reflective	 awareness	 of	 experience	 as such	 is	 therefore	


















Figure 1: Cover,	Phenomenology of Perception	translated	by	Colin	Smith	
(London:	Routledge,	2002).





by	contrast,	explains	 the	 transparency	of	experience	 in	 terms	of	 the	
way	the	environment	is	represented	in	experience	(2002:	380–5).	Un-
like	other	types	of	representational	state	—	for	instance,	imagining	or	











dispute	 between	 naïve	 realists	 and	 intentionalists	 based	 directly	 on	
how	experience	seems	to	us,	because	he	thinks	the	phenomenologi-








If	 this	 is	 right,	 one	 option	 for	 the	 naïve	 realist	 would	 be	 to	 look	 to	
the	epistemic	consequences	of	the	two	views	to	provide	a	way	of	dif-
ferentiating	 them	(in	different	ways,	 see	e.g.	Campbell	2002,	Logue	
2012).	Martin	himself	 thinks	 that	because	 the	naïve	 realist	 claims	 to	
be	 “doing	 justice	 to	 some	 common	 sense	 or	 naïve	 intuition”	 about	
how	experience	appears,	 then	there	should	be	some	way	of	settling	
necessarily	 incomplete,	 because	 our	 experiences	 are	 essentially	 ex-
periences	of	the	world	that	is	independent	of	us.	Merleau-Ponty’s	ex-



















be	a	cost	of	a	 theory	of	perception,	but	perhaps	 it	 is	one	that	 is	ulti-
mately	acceptable	given	other	theoretical	benefits.	On	the	other	hand,	
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cipient’s	body	and	a	 remote	 region	of	 space”	—	or,	as	Merleau-Ponty	
puts	it,	the	gaze	“reaches	[objects]	from	a	distance”.	On	the	other	hand,	




that	 Merleau-Ponty	 uses	 to	 describe	 perception:	 in	 perception	 we	
“gear	into”	the	world	(e.g.	PP	261)	like	the	teeth	in	two	cogs	meshing	











































of	 light	 which	 reveals	 the	 objects	 there	 where	 they	 are	
and	manifests	their	presence,	latent	until	then.	Whether	
I	myself	perceive	or	consider	another	subject	perceiving,	
it	 seems	 to	 me	 that	 the	 gaze	 “is	 posed”	 on	 objects	 and	
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necessarily	rely	on	the	(typically	assumed)	judgments	of	“the	man	on	
the	 Clapham	 omnibus”,	 since	 the	 mythical	 “common	 man”	 will	 nor-
mally	be	in	the	throes	of	“Objective	Thought”.	
One	option,	following	a	suggestion	by	Fish	(2009:	18–20),	would	




there	 is	 the	 challenge	 of	 identifying	 the	 correct	 method	 for	 deter-
mining	the	phenomenological	character	of	experience	in	advance	of	
knowing	 what	 experience	 is	 really	 like.	 These	 two	 concerns	 are	 ex-
acerbated	by	the	fact	that	amongst	the	class	of	people	whom	it	might	
be	natural	to	describe	as	“experts”,	there	may	be	disagreement,	both	
about	 the	 methods	 to	 be	 adopted	 and	 about	 the	 results	 that	 these	
methods	 deliver.	 Still,	 it	 is	 at	 least	 striking	 that	 Merleau-Ponty’s	 de-
scription	of	the	phenomenological	character	of	experience	is	similar	
to	the	independent	description	provided	by	Broad,	who	was	not	only	












In	 considering	 the	 child’s	 experience	 of	 the	 inter-subjective	 world,	








about	 the	way	 that	 things	are	presented	 in	experience	 is	 suggestive	
of	the	naïve	realist’s	claim	that	perceptual	experiences	are	relational	
events	that	are	partly	constituted	by	objects	in	our	environment.	The	




















if	 it	 is	 understood	 in	 a	 strong,	 object-involving	 way,	 then	 the	 contact	 intu-
ition	might	just	be	one	way	of	further	describing	the	transparency	intuition.	
It	is	worth	noting	that	there	is	a	slightly	different	intuition	that	is	sometimes	
















ficient	 causal	 process;	 this	 would	 be	 more	 naturally	 suggestive	 of	 a	
variation	on	the	view	that	Merleau-Ponty	ascribes	to	common	sense,	
according	 to	 which	 perceptual	 experiences	 are	 distinct	 existences	





For	 children	 the	 movement	 that	 goes	 from	 the	 eyes	 to	









most	highly	 favoured	extramissionist	 responses,	according	 to	which	
there	is	a	simultaneous	input	and	output,	or	views	according	to	which	
there	is	an	input	followed	by	an	output.	
Assuming	 that	 the	 visual	 experience	 is	 ostensively	 saltatory	 and	
prehensive,	the	second	question	is	whether	this	provides	a	reason	to	
prefer	 the	 claim	 that	 perceptual	 experiences	 are	 essentially	 relation-
al.	 According	 to	 non-relationalist	 views,	 perceptual	 experiences	 are	
Merleau-Ponty	appeals	to	findings	by	Piaget	which	suggest	a	descrip-
tion	of	the	phenomenological	character	of	experience	that	is	similar	to	







The	view	of	perception	 that	 this	 suggests	has	 similarities	 to	ancient	













































A	 common	 naïve	 realist	 strategy	 for	 accounting	 for	 illusion	 and	
(particularly)	hallucination	is	to	combine	a	naïve	realist	theory	of	per-
ception	with	a	form	of	disjunctivism.	According	to	standard	forms	of	
disjunctivism,	 perception	 (on	 the	 one	 hand)	 and	 illusion	 and	 hallu-
cination	(on	the	other)	are	essentially,	or	most	fundamentally,	differ-
















way.	 But	 it	 is	 far	 from	 clear	 that	 this	 captures	 the	 distinctive	 way in	
which	objects	are	presented	 in	experience:	 that	non-neutrally	 repre-
senting	the	existence	of	objects	in	the	environment	is	sufficient	to	ex-












response.	 It	 is	 also	 consistent	 with	 the	 input-followed-by-output	 re-
sponse,	if	it	is	assumed	(as	naïve	realists	typically	do)	that	causal	pro-
cesses	involving	light	and	visual	processing	mechanisms	are	enabling	
conditions	 of	 perceptual	 experiences	 that	 constitutively	 depend	 on	






























hallucination.	 In	 particular,	 both	 are	 modalities	 of	 a	 “single	 primor-
dial	function	by	which	we	arrange	around	ourselves	a	milieu	with	a	
definite	structure”,	and	it	is	because	of	this	shared	basis	that	we	can	be	
deceived	when	we	are	hallucinating:	“this fiction can only count as reality 












For	 Merleau-Ponty,	 perceptual	 experiences	 “in	 the	 full	 sense	 of	 the	





involves	 communion	 or	 communication	 “with	 an	 insurmountable	
plenitude”	(PP	337,	354),	hallucinations	“play	out	on	a	different	stage”	
(PP	355).16 





veridical	perceptual	experiences	—	or	at	any	 rate,	 it	 is	often	possible	
to	 tell	 that	you	are	perceiving	when	you	are	perceiving,	even	 if	 it	 is	
not	 always	 possible	 to	 tell	 that	 you	 are	 hallucinating	 when	 you	 are	











Merleau-Ponty’s	 account	 of	 hallucinations	 can	 be	 extended	 to	 account	 for	
illusions.	



























it	 represents	 a	 promising	 account	 of	 hallucination	 from	 the	 disjunc-
tivist	 perspective.19	 Contemporary	 disjunctivists	 often	 give	 negative,	
relational	characterisations	of	hallucination,	as	mental	events	that	are	


















Hallucination	 is	 like	 imagination	 in	 this	 respect.	 Someone	 who	 hal-









is	 only	 because	 we	 are	 bodily	 subjects	 with	 sensory	 fields	 who	 are	
embedded	 within	 the	 world	 that	 hallucination	 and	 imagination	 are	
possible:	
The	world	remains	the	vague	place	of	all	our	experiences.	
It	 accommodates,	 pell-mell,	 true	 objects	 as	 well	 as	 indi-
vidual	and	fleeting	fantasies	—	because	it	is	an	individual	
that	encompasses	everything	and	not	a	collection	of	ob-
jects	 linked	 together	 through	 causal	 relations.	 To	 have	
hallucinations	 and,	 in	 general,	 to	 imagine	 is	 to	 exploit	
18.	 Merleau-Ponty	does	not	discuss	imagination	in	much	detail,	though	it	is	clear	
from	what	he	does	say	 that	his	view	of	 the	 imagination	 is	at	 least	broadly	
similar	to	the	view	that	Sartre	presents	in	more	detail	in	The Imaginary	(1940).
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The	 underlying	 problem	 with	 Intellectualist	 accounts	 of	 hallucina-
tion	—	a	problem	which	Intellectualist	accounts	share	with	Empiricist	




It	 might	 be	 suggested	 that	 Merleau-Ponty’s	 account	 of	 hallucina-
tion	faces	a	version	of	 the	“screening	off”	objection	that	 is	often	 lev-
eled	 against	 contemporary	 forms	 of	 disjunctivism	 (cf.	 Martin	 2004).	
According	to	the	“screening	off”	objection,	if	whatever	occurs	when	we	





character	 of	 experience	 the	 subject’s	 relationship	 to	 mind-indepen-
dent	 objects,	 properties,	 and	 relations	 in	 the	 world.	 Assuming	 that	
there	is	a	common	element	to	hallucination	and	perception	that	is	suf-
ficient	 to	account	 for	 the	phenomenal	character	of	experience,	 then	




























By	 identifying	 hallucinations	 with	 episodes	 of	 sensory	 imagin-
ing	—	perception-like	 episodes	 with	 phenomenal	 character	—	the	 dis-
junctivist	can	provide	an	account	of	why	hallucinations	are	not	distin-
guished	from	veridical	perceptual	experience	in	cases	 in	which	they	





hallucinate	 do	 not,	 Merleau-Ponty	 claims,	 typically	 believe	 or	 judge	
that	they	are	perceiving:
madmen	 do	 not	 believe	 they	 see	 or,	 so	 long	 as	 they	 are	
questioned,	they	correct	their	declarations	on	this	point.	
The	hallucination	is	not	a	rash	judgment	or	belief	for	the	
same	 reasons	 that	 prevent	 it	 from	 being	 a	 sensory	 con-
tent:	judgment	or	belief	could	only	consist	in	positing	the	
hallucination	 as	 true,	 and	 this	 is	 precisely	 what	 the	 pa-
tients	do	not	do.	On	the	level	of	judgment,	patients	distin-
guish	between	hallucination	and	perception	(PP	350–1).
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These	 purely	 hypothetical	 cases	 of	 “causally	 matching”	 hallucina-
tion	are	central	to	presentations	of	the	causal	argument	from	halluci-














proximate	 causes	 of	 perceptual	 experience	 in	 the	 brain	 generate	 ex-
periences	 that	 are	 indistinguishable	 in	 every	 respect	 from	 a	 veridi-
cal	perceptual	experience.	The	envisaged	situation,	however,	 is	one	




are	possible,	but	of	 itself	 this	primordial	 function	is	not	sufficient	to	






it	 takes	 for	 granted	 the	 given	 objects	 upon	 which	 intel-
ligence	 projects	 its	 light,	 whereas	 the	 core	 function	 we	
are	 speaking	 of	 here	—	prior	 to	 making	 us	 see	 or	 know	







A	 second	 version	 of	 the	 “screening	 off”	 objection	 is	 that	 if	 hallu-
cination	also	involves	taking	the	world	to	be	a	certain	way,	then	this	
represents	 a	 common	 element	 to	 perception	 and	 hallucination	 that	
threatens	 to	 “screen	 off”	 whatever	 else	 is	 uniquely	 true	 of	 veridical	
perceptual	experience.	But	this	does	not	provide	a	common	element	
to	perception	and	hallucination	 that	 is	 sufficient	 to	explain	 the	phe-
nomenal	 character	of	experience,	either.	For	Merleau-Ponty	 there	 is	
always	a	phenomenally	discernible	difference	between	hallucination	





A	 third	objection,	 following	on	 from	this,	 is	 that	Merleau-Ponty’s	
account	doesn’t	address	the	types	of	hallucinations	that	are	most	com-
monly	discussed	in	the	philosophical	literature:	hallucinations	that	are	
















proximate cause, same immediate effect	 does	 not	 hold	 where	 there	 are	
additional	 conditions	 necessary	 for	 the	 occurrence	 of	 certain	 kinds	




5. Realism and Transcendental Naïve Realism




















more	 generally.	 The	 character	 of	 perceptual	 experience	 depends	 in-
stead	on	the	nature	of	the	subject’s	entire	body	and	the	environment	
in	which	they	are	embedded.	The	physical	events	 that	 take	place	 in	
the	brain	and	central	nervous	system	are	at	best	enabling	conditions	
of	perceptual	experience;	they	make	perceptual	experience	of	the	sub-
ject’s	 environment	 possible,	 without	 determining	 the	 nature	 of	 that	














assumption	 of	 both	 empirical	 work	 on	 sense	 experience	 and	 philo-
sophical	discussion	of	 it”	 (Martin	2006:	n.8);	 it	does	not	of	 itself	 in-
volve	a	commitment	to	any	form	of	reductive	physicalism,	just	to	the	
much	more	minimal	claim	 that	experiences	do	not	stand	outside	of	
the	 causal	 order.	 Whether	 naïve	 realists	 should	 accept	 Experiential	







ambiguous	hold	on	an	 “inexhaustible”	world	 that	 lends	 itself	 “to	an	













sense	 that	our	knowledge	of	 it	 comes,	 in	 the	first	 instance,	 through	
perception.	Merleau-Ponty	seems	to	suggest,	moreover,	 that	 the	per-
ceived	world	enjoys	a	kind	of	metaphysical	primacy:





22.	 Compare	 Merleau-Ponty’s	 discussion	 of	 his	 experience	 of	 his	 neighbour’s	






Merleau-Ponty’s	 denial	 of	 Experiential	 Naturalism	 may	 be	 symp-
tomatic	of	a	broader	contrast	between	his	approach	and	that	of	many	
contemporary	 naïve	 realists:	 Merleau-Ponty’s	 approach,	 at	 least	 in	







Merleau-Ponty	 is	 working	 in	 the	 post-Kantian	 tradition,	 and	 like	
Husserl	before	him,	he	sees	phenomenology	as	a	form	of	transcenden-
tal	enquiry.	This	 involves,	at	a	minimum,	 identifying	 transcendental	
conditions	 that	 provide	 “how	 possible”	 explanations	 of	 phenomena	
like	our	experience	of	the	world;	as	Merleau-Ponty	says	on	the	very	
first	page	of	the	Preface	to	Phenomenology,	phenomenology	is	“a	tran-












continuously	breathes	 life	 into	the	visible	spectacle,	animates	 it	and	


























exploration	 that	 the	 consideration	 of	 Merleau-Ponty’s	 theory	 of	 per-
ception	helps	 to	disclose:	 the	possibility	of	understanding	the	naïve	
realist	theory	of	perception	as	a	transcendental	theory	of	perception.




















To	 the	 extent	 that	 Merleau-Ponty’s	 view	 in	 the	 Phenomenology	 is	
a	 form	 of	 idealism,	 Merleau-Ponty	 cannot	 naturally	 be	 described	 as	
accepting	a	naïve	realist theory	of	perception;	at	best	he	may	be	said	
to	share	some	of	 the	naïve	realist’s	core	theoretical	commitments.	 It	
is	 controversial,	 however,	 whether	 Merleau-Ponty’s	 view	 in	 the	 Phe-
nomenology	really	is	—	or	at	any	rate,	ought	to	be	—	a	form	of	idealism.24 
Commenting	on	the	Phenomenology, Beaufret,	for	example,	claims	that	
Merleau-Ponty’s	 main	 problem	 is	 that	 he	 has	 not	 been	 “sufficiently	














this	 is	 necessarily	 problematic.	 Compare,	 for	 example,	 Pihlström’s	 descrip-
tion	of	the	“idealist	objection”	to	the	use	of	transcendental	arguments	as	an	
oxymoron	(2004:	310,	n.	12).









































































27.	 For	 further	 discussion	 of	 what,	 if	 anything,	 is	 common	 to	 all	 manifesta-
tions	 of	 transcendental	 philosophy,	 see	 e.g.	 Pihlström	 (2004).	 Note	 that	
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